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Measurable Outcomes of Safety Culture in Aviation: A Meta-Analytic Review 
 Though the concept of safety culture has existed in some iteration or another for over 30 
years, it has with relative rarity been the subject of empirical studies seeking to to examine the 
efficacy of a positive safety culture with respect to measurable safety performance.  Given that 
civilian aviation has long been at the fore of the study and development of human-centric safety 
programs, this scarcity of data and reported effect size is somewhat surprising (O'Connor, O'Dea, 
Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011).  This study addressed this problem and contributed to the 
advancement of the field of aviation safety as it sought to consolidate previous efforts into a 
meaningful, scientifically-based consensus.  In addition, this study identified and quantified the 
effect size associated with different levels and different measures of safety culture with respect to 
resultant safety performance, with empirically-derived weighting of studies to support 
conclusions.  This research provides a foundation upon which further inquiry into safety culture 
interventive policies and procedures can be based and lends validity to those instruments that 
contribute most to the understanding of organizational safety culture as it relates to measured 
safety behavior. 
Problem Statement, Research Question, and Hypotheses 
This study addressed the research question: does a positive safety culture in an aviation 
setting, as measured by some recognized instrument, demonstrate significant relationships with 
safety performance?  Safety performance was contextually defined as those behaviors and 
outcomes that are generally recognized indicators of the level of safety of an organization and 
included but was not limited to incident and accident reports, lost time, reported injuries, annual 
cost of incidents/accidents, accident/incident rate, audit performance, timeliness of hazard report 
resolution, and others.  A priori, we hypothesized that safety culture would demonstrate a 
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negative correlation with reported incidents and accidents (positive measures of safety 
culture/climate related to lower rates of incidents and accidents).  This same hypothesis was 
extended to include leading indicators of safety, though the correlation here was hypothesized to 
be positive (higher measure of positive culture correlates to positive safety performance).  The 
purpose of this research was threefold: to perform a systematic review of relevant literature, to 
identify via meta-analysis the effect of safety culture on safety performance in an aviation 
operational setting, and to make recommendations for further research and improvements to 
validity or reliability of safety culturel measurement instruments. 
Review of Literature 
The phrase safety culture became part of the common safety lexicon following its use in 
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s report on the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 (Makino, 
2006).  Though several definitions of safety culture have been put forward in an effort to clarify 
or constrain the concept, the definition continues to evolve alongside the safety industry.  
Perhaps the most seminal of descriptions of the concept of an organizational safety culture is that 
put forth by the Advisory Committee on Safety in Nuclear Installations and suggested by Cox 
and Flin (1998) as the most widely used of the many definitions in the literature:  “the safety 
culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety management” (Health and Safety 
Commission, 1993, p. 23).  While this definition suffices as a means of narrowing focus within 
the context of this study, it is certainly not a consensus nor is it the only valid definition of safety 
culture.  
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Alongside the literature that addresses safety culture is the substantially similar concept 
of climate.  Organizational climate, and safety climate by extension, tends to be the more 
prevalent measure in questionnaires and surveys that seek to measure current perceptions and 
attitudes with respect to safety.   Illustrating its similarity to culture is Zohar’s (1980) seminal 
definition of climate: “…a summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their work 
environments… a frame of reference for guiding appropriate and adaptive task behaviours (sic)” 
(p. 96).  As in the literature specific to safety culture, no consensus view of the appropriateness 
of measurement of safety climate exists as a reliable predictor of safety performance, especially 
in the context of an aviation organization. 
Cox and Flin (1998) likened the relationship between the constructs of safety culture and 
safety climate to measurement of personality (culture) and mood (climate).  Debate continues 
over the semantic and operational differences between culture and climate as used to describe 
certain organizational characteristics within an operational safety framework.  However, in the 
context of this research the terms were used interchangeably with the intended meaning being 
rooted in the International Atomic Energy Agency’s vision of culture (Health and Safety 
Commission, 1993) while being more temporally aligned with the foregoing description of 
climate, and with the understanding that the two ideas are conceptually complimentary.  This 
broad, encompassing view of safety culture has been supported empirically (Hoffman & Mark, 
2006) in the context of relating safety performance to sub-dimensions of safety and functions in 
the present application to retain an inclusive definition for the purpose of deriving a population 
for meta-analysis. 
 Safety performance remains subject whose dimensionality has not been widely explored.   
However, it is an important concept to specify considering that studying safety climate, an 
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equally variable construct, as an antecedent to safety performance has been the subject of 
research over the past three decades and forms the basis for the present study.  The concept of 
performance encompasses the actual behaviors performed by individuals at work.  Although 
accident rate in many aspects of the aviation industry is too low to offer a sensitive measure of 
safety performance, other leading indicators of performance collected by aviation operators may 
supplement incident rate as a measure of safety intervention effectiveness (O'Connor, et al., 
2011).  Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, and Smith-Crowe (2002) identified four safety performance factors 
through confirmatory factor analysis: using personal protective equipment, engaging in work 
practices to reduce risk, communicating health and safety information, and exercising employee 
rights and responsibilities.  Though the Burke et al. (2002) research provides a foundation for 
defining safety performance, its conception is arguably limited in generalizability to other 
industries, despite the importance of the identified relationship of knowledge and training to each 
of these factors.  Safety knowledge, participation, and compliance were identified as constructs 
of performance by Griffin and Neal (2000); and Hoffman and Stetzer (1996) considered similar 
group-level and individual behaviors.  In the present study, a holistic view of performance 
indicators was adopted in order to more inclusively capture the relevant studies. 
Though safety culture (or climate) was the primary focus of this research, it is not the 
only probable antecedent to safety performance.  Perhaps the most pronounced, and logical, 
predictor of safety performance is the set of hazards associated with the operational environment.  
We attempted to control for these by limiting the scope of analysis to studies within the aviation 
operations sector, thus assuring at least a baseline homogeneity in the scope of hazards under 
study.  Proactive safety strategies, such as safety-related training or policies and procedures, are 
also a likely predictor of lower accident rates and positive safety behaviors (Hayes, Perander, 
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Smecko, & Trask, 1998).  For the purpose of this research, only safety culture and climate were 
of interest as antecedents, though safety commitment is arguably an antecedent of culture itself 
(e.g., Clarke, 1999; Human Engineering, 2005), and some conclusions may be drawn about the 
inherent link to the present research.  Figure 1 illustrates this conceptual link and the focus 
within this research on only the relationship between culture and performance. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Relationship between antecedents of safety culture and performance. 
 
Meta-Analysis Criteria 
Over the past three decades, researchers have struggled to identify clear evidence that 
links safety climate to safety performance.  Cooper and Phillips (2004) identified four research 
directions within the field of safety culture: the design of psychometric measurement 
instruments, exploration of links between safety culture and organizational culture, identification 
of theoretical antecedents of safety behavior, and the study of the relationship between safety 
climate and actual safety performance.  Within the latter segment, researchers have studied the 
link between safety climate and behavior in chemical processing (Hoffman & Stetzer, 1996), 
manufacturing (Zohar, 2000), nuclear waste handling (Smith-Crowe, Burke, & Landis, 2003), 
construction (Glendon & Litherland, 2000), and offshore oil and gas (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 
2003), among others.  Within this already small body of research, only a few studies were found 
to have addressed aviation specifically.  These studies are discussed in turn, with specific 
attention paid to sources of bias, sample methods, reliability, validity of the measurement 
Safety 
Culture 
Safety 
Commitment 
Safety 
Performance 
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instrument, effect size, and direction of the relationship between the concepts of culture, climate, 
or attitudes and safety performance.  Specific inclusion criteria that dictated selection of the 
studies shown in Table 1 are addressed in the sections that follow.  Of note is that few studies in 
the survey of literature contained the effect size information necessary for inclusion in a meta-
analysis. 
 
Table 1 
Studies Initially Selected for Inclusion in Meta-Analysis 
Authors (Data) Scale Used Outcome Measure Sample N 
Brittingham 
(2006) 
Maintenance Climate 
Assessment Survey 
None used US Navy 
maintainers 
126,058 
Helmreich, et al. 
(1986) 
Cockpit Management 
Attitudes 
Questionnaire 
Check pilot-rated performance Pilots from 
three major 
US airlines 
114 
Hernandez 
(2001) 
Maintenance Climate 
Assessment Survey 
Incident rate US Navy 
maintainers 
2,180 
O’Connor, et al. 
(2011) 
Command Safety 
Assessment Survey 
Mishap rate US Navy 
aircrews 
23,442 
Sexton  & 
Klinect (2001) 
Flight Management 
Attitudes Short 
Survey 
Errors (undesired aircraft 
state), error chains, policy 
violations, crew effectiveness 
measured by LOSA observers 
Major US 
airline crews 
163 
 
 
Studies Included for Meta-Analysis 
Brittingham’s (2006) research sought to address the relationship between US Naval 
aviation mishaps and squadron maintenance safety climate.  The Maintenance Climate 
Assessment Survey (MCAS) data collected between August 2000 and August 2005 were used to 
investigate whether MCAS results were predictive of mishap likelihood for Naval and Marine 
Corps Aviation squadrons.  The validity of the MCAS and its safety categories was examined in 
this study through principal component analysis and principal axis factoring as well as through 
ANOVA and scale discrimination and correlation.  In this phase of the research, the study author 
6
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol1/iss4/1
revealed that the MCAS appeared to load onto a single factor that explained roughly 50 percent 
of the variance.  Two other factors showed only minimal influence, contrary to Baker’s (1991) 
research that developed the original MCAS, and in any event, Brittingham (2006) was unable to 
show that the MCAS was a valid tool for evaluating the Model of Organizational Safety 
Effectiveness it was purported to measure.  Consequently, the intended analysis of MCAS 
results’ relationship to mishaps was not undertaken, and conclusions of the research focused 
primarily on recommendations for survey review.  This conclusion was puzzling given the 
widespread use of the MCAS, though no definite indication was given as to whether the MCAS 
instrument had undergone structural changes that may have affected its utility as an indicator of 
safety culture consistent with the factors of interest. 
 Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, and Russini (1986) measured attitudes of flight crew 
members against flying performance evaluations.  Culture and climate were not explicitly 
mentioned as elements of measurement; however, attitudes were a principal component of 
culture and climate (Diaz & Cabrera, 1997).  Because the instrument used in the study (Cockpit 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire [CMAQ]) was based on Likert scale responses, the 
potential for central tendency bias was present, though it was not addressed by the study authors.  
The CMAQ has been shown to be both reliable and sensitive, and to have good content and 
predictive validity (Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990).  Study subjects were selected from 
the existing CMAQ database of 658 respondents.  From this group, 114 pilots currently flying 
Boeing 727 and 737 aircraft were chosen for evaluation of performance.  Performance 
assessment was completed by check pilot raters who observed line flight operations involving 
subject crew and rated performance on a Likert-scale questionnaire.  Discriminant analysis was 
used to compare subjects who were rated as superior with those rated as below average.  The 
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reported Wilk’s lambda was 0.36, and the associated chi-square of 36.78, df = 18, p = 0.006, 
corresponds to the significant predictive power of the measured attitudes toward cockpit safety 
and operational performance. 
Hernandez (2001) analyzed results from the MCAS taken from US Naval aviation 
maintenance facilities and submitted via the internet.  The use of internet-reported survey results 
introduces an element of convenience to the sampling method, and the concurrent availability of 
the instrument in paper and electronic forms could have introduced bias as only the electronic 
records were used in the study.  The researcher did note that no significant differences appeared 
to exist between the paper-and-pencil version of the survey instrument and the electronic one.  
Despite the reservations with respect to validity raised by Brittingham (2006), Hernandez 
referred to recent revalidations of the MCAS by two researchers in independent studies only a 
year prior to his research.  Results from the MCAS were statistically evaluated through ANOVA 
and MANOVA as appropriate against the components of the Model of Organizational Safety 
Effectiveness (MOSE) used by the US Navy.  A total of 1,731 surveys were selected from the 
total of 2,180 and were used for analysis.  A number of analyses were conducted, and as a 
measure of the relationship between MCAS score and unit-level incidents, linear regression was 
conducted with unit mean MCAS score as the independent variable and incident rate as the 
dependent variable.  For all models, the estimated slope was negative (-61.38, t = -0.36) and 
indistinguishable from random effects (p = 0.720), R2 = 0.005, F = .131 (df = 1).  The study 
author noted that sample size may have affected this relationship as well as the theorized rise in 
safety awareness following an incident or accident. 
O’Connor, Buttrey, O’Dea, & Kennedy (2011) used logistic regression modeling to 
investigate whether results of the Command Safety Assessment Survey were useful in 
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differentiating US Navy squadrons with recent mishaps and those without.  Survey responses 
from 23,442 US Naval aircrew members were used in the regression models tested in this 
research.  The study authors carefully discuss discriminate and construct validity of the 
measurement instrument.  Similar discussions of discriminate and construct validity were 
noticeably lacking from much of the reviewed literature on safety culture or climate, and this 
discussion substantially addressed primary threats of bias in the research.  To correct for central 
tendency bias that may have been present where many respondents gave the very same numeric 
response to almost all survey items, the researchers replaced the responses with the difference 
between that response and the mode for that respondent.  Potential bias in the classification of 
mishap severity was addressed by the use of the Naval Safety Center summaries and severity 
ratings coupled with independent review by two researchers.  Regression models were 
sequentially evaluated using the Akaike Information Criterion value to determine what term was 
added.  Sequential regression methods may not always result in a sensible model, but the study 
authors noted, “our goal is not to select the “correct” set of variables, nor to obtain accurate 
estimates of individual regression coefficients” (O'Connor et al., 2011, p. 16).  Instead, the study 
sought primarily to identify a simple model with reasonable predictions.  The final of ten logistic 
regression model iterations resulted in R2 = 0.206, df = 4, 0.831 area under the curve, and a 
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value of 0.98.  This model included only factor one (personnel leadership; 
items 4, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, and 48 – items 4, 13, and 17 were shown in the regression results to be 
the only three items predictive of mishaps) results and omitted the two communities that 
experienced no mishaps at all during the period under investigation. 
Sexton and Klinect (2001) explored the relationship between pilot performance and self-
reported perceptions of organizational culture among airline flight crews.  They echoed a 
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recurring theme from the literature in noting that the link between organizational culture and 
flight or safety performance was largely anecdotal.  Data were collected during Line Operations 
Safety Audits (LOSA) on randomly-selected revenue flights at a major airline using the Flight 
Management Attitudes Short Survey (FMASS), the result of an effort to shorten the Flight 
Management Attitudes Questionnaire, for which validity and reliability was established in 
research by Helmreich, Merritt, Sherman, Gregorich, and Wiener (1993) and by Helmreich and 
Merritt (1998).  As in other studies addressed here, the survey instrument used a Likert scale and 
may have introduced bias via central tendency in responses.  Bias was controlled in LOSA 
observer responses through training and calibration to a group norm of .80 or higher.  An 
omnibus test for safety culture yielded a significant Hotelling’s Trace F (12, 124) = 2.39, 
p ≤ 0.008.  For job attitudes, the omnibus test was marginally significant, Hotelling’s Trace 
F(12, 84) = 1.74, p ≤ 0.074.  The use of two separate MANOVAs contributed to an inflated 
alpha, and the MANOVAs did not include nearly a third of the flight crews (those that did not 
commit errors recorded in the LOSA observation). 
Methods and Procedures 
A review of literature was conducted by searching commercial databases including 
Science Direct, ProQuest, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, Google Scholar, and PsychInfo for 
research articles, doctoral dissertations, conference proceedings, and manuscripts addressing the 
role of safety culture as an antecedent to safety performance, primarily but not exclusively in an 
aviation operational setting.  Keywords included the terms aviation, safety, culture, climate, 
outcome, performance, injury, accident, and incident in Boolean logical combinations to identify 
relevant articles, specifically those that were published within the last ten years. This timeframe 
was loosely imposed, but was intended to structure the search given the emergence of safety 
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management systems in aviation in that time period and the accompanying increase in awareness 
of the concept of safety culture.  A manual search of reference lists of included articles was also 
used to supplement the electronic database search.  These methods resulted in the identification 
of approximately 158 articles, including those unrelated to aviation, from which the meta-
analysis sample was selected. 
Inclusion Criteria 
Studies were selected for further analysis in accordance with The Cochrane 
Collaboration’s guidelines for conducting a systematic review of research literature.  The 
Cochrane Collaboration is an international not-for-profit organization focused on the furtherance 
of evidence-based healthcare that publishes guidance concerning systematic reviews and meta-
analytic studies (The Cochrane Collaboration, n.d.).  While the Cochrane review processes 
generally relate to human healthcare, the process established a scientific rigor and transparency 
to the methods used for selection of studies for review, thus reducing bias.  This reduction in bias 
and structure, which is not specific to any one field of research, led the authors to use to apply 
the Cochrane process to aviation for what appears to be the first time. 
To identify content appropriate for inclusion in the meta-analysis, abstracts for each 
article were reviewed.  Those studies that did not identify data because of a focus on theoretical 
investigation or literature reviews were excluded from consideration for further analysis.  This 
initial qualification of articles for study reduced the population to 51 studies. 
Only those studies that deployed a safety culture or climate measurement instrument to 
evaluate these measures in participants within aviation organizations were included.  
Furthermore, studies outside the scope of flight operations, aircraft maintenance, or aircraft 
ground handling and service were also excluded.  Review of the remaining studies by both 
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authors excluded those that did not address at least one of the previously discussed safety 
performance constructs in conjunction with safety culture or climate.  Next, studies that utilized 
non-unique samples were excluded when it was determined that no unique relationships were 
presented in a subsequent analysis.  In these cases, only the primary work was included for 
further inquiry.  Finally, and most importantly, in cases where reported results were insufficient 
for the calculation of an effect size, the study was excluded.  Application of these criteria 
resulted in five studies for possible inclusion in the meta-analysis.  Only four studies were truly 
appropriate for inclusion upon further review, as Brittingham (2006) elected not to investigate 
the link between culture measurement and safety performance on the basis that the instrument 
was found to be flawed.  The meta-analysis was subsequently accomplished with two separate 
omnibus measures from Sexton and Klinect (2001) that represented safety culture and job 
attitudes as separate constructs.  The literature review provided sufficient support for the 
interconnectedness of these constructs with respect to safety climate and culture to validate the 
inclusion of the job attitudes measure, the results of which are addressed in the following 
discussions. 
Data Coding 
Coding procedures were not as extensive as in some examples where experimental 
designs are used or several moderating variables are present.  In this case, the authors reviewed 
the studies as outlined in the preceding section, and the very small number of studies that met the 
basic inclusion criteria made creation of a coding manual unnecessary.  The authors reviewed the 
list of potential studies for analysis independently, and any disagreement was resolved through 
discussion.  The lack of reported or calculable effect size measurements in the bulk of studies 
resulted in identical lists from both authors, and discussion was generally limited to inclusion of 
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both measures as reported in Sexton and Klinect (2001) and to what extent inclusion may violate 
assumptions of independence.  Similarly, the final list of studies was reviewed to code, or extract 
information including at least: 
• APA style reference (all studies), 
• measurement instrument type, 
• aviation context (all studies), 
• study design, 
• subjects, 
• N, 
• effect size and calculation method, and 
• eligibility for inclusion. 
Effect Sizes 
In contrast to a narrative review, many of which focus on or base conclusions largely on 
p-values, this research focused instead on effect sizes as a function of size and direction of the 
relationship between safety culture and safety performance.  Whereas p-value only indicates 
statistical significance and that the effect size is probably not zero, it does not necessarily serve 
as an indicator of the size of the effect.  As discussed previously however, the reported results of 
the studies selected for inclusion were heterogeneous.  To obtain a homogenous measure of 
effect size, reported results were converted to r as a measure of correlation.  Computation of r 
was completed as follows: 
• Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, and Russini (1986) reported Wilk’s lambda of 0.360.  
As a multivariate measure of correlation, Wilk’s lambda can be converted to a 
canonical correlation (analogous to r) using Equation 1. 
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 √1    (1) 
Using this computation, the correlation associated with Helmreich, et al.’s (1986) 
results was calculated as 0.800. 
• Hernandez (2001) reported results of the linear regression as R2 = 0.005217, resulting 
in a computed R of 0.072. 
• O’Connor, et al. (2011) reported the logistic regression result R2 = 0.206, giving a 
computed R of 0.454. 
• Sexton and Klinect (2001) reported an omnibus result as Hotelling’s trace with 
F(12, 124) = 2.39.  Critical F-value was computed as 1.83, which indicated that the 
result was significant as reported in the article.  Conversion to r was accomplished as 
in Equation 2: 
  	
 (2) 
The computed r-value using Equation 2 was 0.433 (included in Figures 2 and 3) for 
safety culture and 0.446 for job attitudes (included in Figure 3 only). 
Results 
Because the variance depends strongly on the correlation, the meta-analysis did not 
perform syntheses on the correlation coefficient itself, but rather on the Fisher’s Z as computed 
using the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (CMA) software package (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, 
& Rothstein, 2009).  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the forest plots for the random effects model with 
and without the job attitudes result from Sexton and Klinect (2001).  The random-effects model  
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 Figure 2.  Random effects meta-analysis schematic (without Sexton, et al. (2001) attitudes). 
 
 
Figure 3.  Random effects meta-analysis schematic (with Sexton, et al. (2001) attitudes). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Random effects meta-analysis results (with Sexton, et al. (2001) attitudes). 
 
Table 2  
Random Effects Model Measures of Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity 
Q-value df (Q) P-value I-squared 
146.237 4.000 0.000 97.265 
 
was used, as the fixed-effects assumption of homogeneity of true effect size across studies was 
untenable.  Differences in study participants, as well as the underlying construct definitions, 
Study name Statistics for each study Correlation and 95% CI
Lower Upper 
Correlation limit limit Z-Value p-Value
Helmriech, et al. (1986) 0.800 0.722 0.858 11.575 0.000
Hernandez (2001) 0.072 0.025 0.119 2.998 0.003
O'Connor, et al. (2011) 0.454 0.348 0.549 7.571 0.000
Sexton, et al. (2001) 0.433 0.222 0.605 3.823 0.000
0.483 0.088 0.746 2.352 0.019
-0.90 -0.45 0.00 0.45 0.90
Study name Statistics for each study Correlation and 95% CI
Lower Upper 
Correlation limit limit Z-Value p-Value
Helmriech, et al. (1986) 0.800 0.722 0.858 11.575 0.000
Hernandez (2001) 0.072 0.025 0.119 2.998 0.003
O'Connor, et al. (2011) 0.454 0.348 0.549 7.571 0.000
Sexton, et al. (2001) 0.433 0.222 0.605 3.823 0.000
Sexton, et al. (2001b) 0.446 0.194 0.643 3.323 0.001
0.476 0.136 0.715 2.669 0.008
-0.90 -0.45 0.00 0.45 0.90
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contributed to differing effect sizes characterizing each study, though inclusion criteria ensured 
that the effect sizes were at least similar.   
Figure 4 provides sample size, native and computed statistics for each study, correlation 
and confidence intervals, and study weights under the random effects model.  The random effects 
weights shown here have a much narrower range than the fixed effects counterpart because the 
supposition that all studies share the same true effect size was rejected in favor of assuming that 
each study may have had a different true effect.  Table 2 provides several measures for 
identifying and quantifying the variation in true effect sizes among studies.   
Discussion 
The meta-analytically calculated summary effect size using the random effects model and 
including both safety culture and job attitudes from Sexton and Klinect (2001) was 0.476, 
p = 0.008.  This result is a measure of correlation and was interpreted here as a Pearson’s 
coefficient.  Thus, the summary effect size showed a statistically significant moderate positive 
effect.  This result was substantially similar to the one obtained without the addition of job 
attitudes.  Though inclusion of attitudes as a separate study may compromise independence, the 
results do not appear to be affected, with a correlation coefficient of 0.483, p = .019 as the 
alternative result.   
Some discussion of heterogeneity is warranted given the large value of Q in Table 2.  Q is 
a statistic that represents the ratio of observed variation to within-study error – a measure of 
dispersion (Borenstein, et al., 2009).  In this context, Q represented a first step in determining 
homogeneity across studies in the analysis.  Because p < .001, it can be inferred that the true 
effects did indeed vary, though it is not a direct measure of the actual amount of dispersion given 
that the results were sensitive to the number of studies included in the analysis.  The reported 
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value of Q indicated that excess dispersion in the study was not zero, as Q was larger than df.  
The large reported I2 meant that further investigation of the reasons for the variance was 
supported.  According to general guidelines presented by Higgins, et al. (2003), the reported I2 
value was rather high, which indicated most of the observed variance was real.  Estimated tau 
and tau-square (T and T2) remove the dependence on the number of studies from the Q estimate 
so that the variance and SD of the true effect could be estimated.  The positive T2 (0.178) was 
expected given the value of Q and is an indication of the absolute amount of variance as opposed 
to a ratio.  The computed value of T of 0.422 described the distribution of effect sizes around the 
mean effect, and in this case, the dispersion was characterized as rather wide.  This conclusion 
was based on T as an estimate of standard deviation, and the large value of T computed here 
meant that most effect sizes fell within a range that extended beyond the possible values of the 
mean correlation. 
Whether or not the effect size could be considered reliable was another subject altogether, 
and the small number of included studies was cause for concern (Ellis, 2010).  Though meta-
analyses can generally be expected to generate higher statistical power and minimize bias, this 
naturally depends on the availability and quality of the included studies.  In the present case, 
significant evidence existed to support a positive link between safety culture and safety behavior.  
However, unpublished studies likely existed that were not available for inclusion, and evidence 
existed to support availability bias as having had a bloating influence on effect size.  When 
graphed, the dispersion of the included studies should describe an inverted funnel shape (Ellis, 
2010).  In this case, both the number of studies and the wide dispersion made it difficult to 
combat the effects of availability bias and over-inflated effect size as a result (see Figure 5 for 
the random effects funnel plot).  Computation of fail-safe N, the number of studies with  
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 Figure 5.  Funnel plot of included studies. 
 
conflicting evidence required to overturn the summary effect, indicated that only five additional, 
contradictory studies (5.443) would nullify the conclusion reached here.  In addition to falling far 
short of the minimum recommended fail-safe N (5k + 10), this result was rather revealing of the 
intolerance of the outcomes here to null findings.  The small number of studies, large degree of 
dispersion, and tenuous summary effect with respect to confounding results combined to restrict 
interpretation of these results to simple observations rather than broader empirical conclusions. 
Limitations 
The results of the meta-analysis must be weighed against the small size of the sample as 
well as the methodology involved.  Although our methods arguably may have allowed for higher 
statistical power, the number of studies in the existing literature remains so few that the meta-
analytically derived effect size was potentially unstable.  From a practical perspective, the 
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climate, and performance, as well as further investigation of the directionality of mediating 
relationships.  The authors look to Helmreich’s (and others’) work on the Cockpit Management 
Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ) as one solution to this problem.  In the CMAQ example, a 
measurement instrument was made available through contact with the study authors in exchange 
for the resultant data.  In the present case, the adoption of a unified instrument with which to 
measure culture or climate is recommended.  Several of these instruments exist, and the 
multitude of available instruments serves as the primary contributor to the problems of reliability 
and construct validity in the measurement of safety culture.  Evans, Glendon, and Creed (2007) 
and von Thaden and Gibbons (2008) have created instruments whose utility has been 
demonstrated for flight operations and that could be or have been adapted to maintenance or 
ground processes as well. 
The primary goal of this research was to consolidate research linking safety culture or 
climate in an aviation organization to safety performance and to evaluate the strength and 
direction of such a relationship.   The paucity of studies that attempted to link these constructs 
presented a substantial limitation to the present research.  Consideration was given to expanding 
the scope of the literature search to include other industries with similar characteristics to 
aviation.  However, it was decided that to do so failed to address the principal research question 
of how safety culture or climate affect performance in aviation organizations in particular.  
Inclusion of research outside of aviation represented another potential source of bias by 
assuming that any observed correlation between culture and performance in one industry would 
be generalizable to aviation, an idea contrary to the observations of Ek and Akselsson (2007) and 
Diaz and Cabrera (1997).  These two studies showed significantly different measures of culture 
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when aviation operations were compared to other modes of transportation (shipping) or even 
other roles within the aviation environment (air traffic control, ground handling).  
From a methodological perspective, the meta-analysis was conducted largely as an 
exploration of the data, however sparse.  The term exploration is critical here in that it points to 
the largely experimental inclusion of multivariate results in the meta-analytic review.  While 
Card (2012) provides methods for computing r from omnibus tests, the authors were unable to 
locate or derive a procedure for computing r from results of multiple regression.  In any event, 
assuming that the computation of r is appropriate as it was done here, it seems logical that each 
study in the meta-analysis would include the same influence of covariates, an assumption that 
was infeasible in the current study.  If access to basic, bivariate correlation information were 
available, then it would be possible that the effect sizes of interest could be independently 
calculated.  Again, this identifies a However, this data was not accessible for review, and thus the 
meta-analysis presented here contains another limitation. 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
This research may itself fall victim to the file drawer problem, which can skew meta-
analytic results by virtue of the tendency to only publish significant results (Borenstein, et al., 
2009; Ellis, 2010).  The present research provides only limited insight to the problem simply 
because the number of studies that related safety culture to safety performance in aviation was so 
small and the type of available studies presented insurmountable methodological challenges.  As 
such, it was impossible to answer the research question definitively or even to properly evaluate 
the hypotheses presented here.  It is however possible to take away valuable information with 
respect to future research.  Looking ahead, the unification of safety culture measurement is a 
worthy goal to work toward.  The opportunity exists for an institution to champion the 
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widespread use of a single measurement instrument, as was done with LOSA at the University of 
Texas, to create a more robust data set from which analyses can draw.  Worth noting as well is 
that the relationship between safety culture and safety commitment (shown in Figure 1) should 
be more closely investigated.  Though it would not have increased the number of studies 
considered in this meta-analysis, a measure of safety commitment should be carefully considered 
for inclusion in any holistic measure of safety culture or climate.  As additional research into the 
constructs of climate and culture are investigated with respect to aviation safety, clear reporting 
of effect size will enable future research to expand upon the foundations discussed here to allow 
a more holistic and inclusive view of the body of knowledge and amalgamate results into a 
meaningful and systemic representation of the whole.  At present, varying constructs, 
instruments, and analysis techniques present researchers an ever-moving target making empirical 
investigation of the relationship between positive safety culture and safety performance a 
yeoman’s task.  
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